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A B S T R A C T
Whether formulated as a security risk, a form of climate adaptation, a legal dilemma, or an issue of (in)justice,
the debate on climate change and migration draws upon multiple, oftentimes contradictory, discourses. This
paper examines the role of racial identities in debates about the security implications of climate-induced mi-
gration (CIM). The paper proposes a reconceptualization of ‘racial logics’: a form of discursive construction that
connects naturalized assumptions about racialized Others with possible outcomes in conditions of future climate
insecurity. The paper argues that ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrant populations – in the context of possible CIM
from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the EU – are racialized with a potential capacity for
radicalization and terrorism. Constructed as racialized Others, ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrant populations could
face exclusionary containment policies in climate-insecure futures. The article concludes with a call to challenge
racial logics and the restrictive, unjust possibilities they suggest for future climate security politics.
1. Introduction
Human migration is a contested topic in climate change scholarship
(Bettini, 2014; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Bierman and Boas, 2008).
From alarmist accounts of ‘climate refugees’ and climate-induced mi-
grants as a security threat (Bettini, 2013), to arguments that situate
climate-induced migration (CIM) as an adaption strategy (Black et al.,
2011), CIM raises a number of important issues. One of these concerns
the role of cultural identities in CIM debates (Farbotko et al., 2016).
How are populations, communities, or individuals ascribed identities in
CIM debates? How do individuals or communities whose (im)mobility
is framed in relation to environmental stresses understand their sense of
Self? Adger et al. (2011) argue that these concerns – nonmaterial,
material and place-based understandings of identity – are under-
represented in environmental decision-making. Similarly, as Baldwin
et al. (2014) note, CIM debates are characterised by a future-condi-
tional relation, about what could happen in conditions of climate in-
security. Building on an emerging literature on the racialization of CIM
(Baldwin, 2013a, 2013b, 2016, 2017; Methmann and Rothe, 2014), this
paper’s contribution is to theorize the construction of cultural (in par-
ticular racialized) identities in CIM’s future-conditional tense. How are
populations racialized in a securitized CIM discourse, and what does
this suggest for how they could, might, are likely to, or will act in climate-
insecure futures?
In particular, I propose a reconceptualization of ‘logics’ – grounded
in Hall’s (1986; 1996) reﬂections on logics and ideology, and
Anderson’s (2010) account of logics and anticipatory futures – as a
framework to explore racialized identities in future-oriented CIM dis-
courses. These constructions are examined in the context of possible
CIM from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region to the EU
(European Union). I argue that, in particular moments of US and EU
climate security discourses, ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’1 populations, when
framed as potential climate-induced migrants, are racialized as poten-
tially prone to radicalization or terroristic violence. Imbued in unequal
power relations, racialized populations could then be subject to unjust
outcomes in climate-insecure futures (e.g. containment policies). To
explore these implications, this paper documents research from an in-
depth textual analysis of three publications from US and EU climate
security contexts (grounded in Fairclough’s (2003) model from critical
linguistics). To begin, however, I outline the ﬁeld of ‘climate security’: a
signiﬁcant backdrop for securitized understandings of CIM.
2. Climate security
An extensive critical academic literature has developed that ex-
plores the security implications of climate change (McDonald, 2013;
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Diez et al., 2016). Scholars have interrogated the power relations of
climate security discourses (Detraz and Betsill, 2009; Oels, 2013;
McDonald, 2013; Von Lucke et al., 2014), securitized dynamics of
CIM (White, 2011; Boas, 2015), biopolitics and climate security
(Grove, 2010; Baldwin, 2013b; Dalby, 2013), and links between cli-
mate security, complexity and resilience (Boas and Rothe, 2016;
Rothe, 2016). Broadly put, ‘climate security’ is concerned with the
security implications of climate change impacts, e.g. territorial loss
from sea-level rise, resource scarcities and the potential for conﬂict,
and how climate change impacts aﬀect energy security outcomes
(Barnett, 2003). In 2003, a Pentagon-commissioned report ﬁrst out-
lined the consequences of climate change for US national security:
Schwartz and Randall (2003) construct an abrupt climate change
scenario (patterned on a similar 100 year event which occurred
8200 years ago) and speculate on its potential security implications,
e.g. conﬂict and resource scarcities. Then, in a 2006 speech former
UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett is believed to have used the
term ‘climate security’ for the ﬁrst time (Trombetta, 2008). Under
Beckett’s leadership, the UN Security Council (UNSC) debated climate
change in April 2007 (UNSC, 2007a and b). A further UNSC debate
was held in June 2011 at the behest of the German government
(UNSC, 2011a and b). Two Arria-Formula meetings (conﬁdential
sessions held by Council Members with other invited parties (UNSC,
2016)) were also held by the UNSC in February 2013 and June 2015
(Werrell and Femia, 2015).
Climate security has been conceptualized in a variety of ways
(McDonald, 2013). For example, climate change is the subject of a
number of reports from national security oriented think tanks (e.g.
Center for Naval Analyses, 2007) and is referenced in several national
security strategies, for instance the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Reviews from the US Department of Defense. A discourse of ‘human
security’ has also gained traction; for example, the IPCC’s Fifth As-
sessment Report (2014) contains a chapter on human security. This is
deﬁned (in the context of climate change) as ‘a condition that exists
when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have
the freedom and capacity to live with dignity’ (Adger et al., 2014: 759).
The authors argue there is ‘high agreement’ that climate change poses
human security risks and that adaptation measures could minimize
these risks (Adger et al., 2014: 777–778). As McDonald (2013: 49,
original emphasis) states, ‘discourses of climate security matter … they
serve to deﬁne who is in need of protection from the threat posed by
climate change; who is capable of providing this protection; and …
what forms responses to these threats might take.’ In support of
McDonald’s (2013) critique, I argue that national security responses are
limited because they can suggest exclusionary outcomes in conditions
of climate insecurity. Campbell (1998 (1992)) contends that national
security depends upon the protection of nation-states from external
‘threats’ or ‘enemies’; it posits binaries of ‘Self/Other’, ‘inside/outside’,
and ‘domestic/foreign’. The paper explores these questions with the
case of racialized Othering (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations) in
representations of CIM from the MENA region to the EU. Given the
exclusionary outcomes these representations suggest, e.g. fortressed
bordering practices or discrimination against migrants, I argue it is
especially important to examine racialization and Othering in relation
to climate-insecure futures. Prior to an elaboration of ‘racial logics’ as a
concept to investigate securitized climate-induced migration dis-
courses, I outline the methodological framework employed in this
paper.
3. Methodology
To highlight processes of racialization in US and EU climate security
discourses, this paper draws upon three examples from a speciﬁc em-
pirical context: representations of CIM (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ popu-
lations) from the MENA region to the EU. In particular, I draw upon a
textual analysis of three documents from earlier EU and US climate
security discourses.2 These are formative, early examples from the
emergence of climate security discourses (the ‘2007 turn’ (Liberatore,
2013)) and their dissemination (Campbell et al., 2007; German Advisory
Council on Global Change (WGBU), 2007; National Intelligence Council
(NIC), 2009). They include a publication from two US think tanks (the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New
American Security (Campbell et al., 2007)), a report from the German
Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU) (WGBU, 2007), and a re-
gional geopolitical report from the 2009 US National Intelligence Council
Estimate (NIC, 2009). These examples are pertinent because they crys-
tallize speciﬁc identity constructions: they represent important moments
of racialization of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants in
relation to future possibilities of climate insecurity. Each example high-
lights a particular association of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrant popula-
tions with naturalized traits, in these cases a propensity towards or
vulnerability to radicalization and acts of terroristic violence. I examine
these examples to explore how racialized identities – in the particular
empirical context of CIM from the MENA region to the EU – are con-
structed in relation to multiple climate-insecure futures (e.g. possibilities
of exclusionary containment policies). In other words, in these cases,
how does a racial logic orient ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced
migrants’ agency in future conditions of climate insecurity?
For each example, I conducted a textual and contextual analysis
(Dittmer, 2010). The textual analysis involved reading through each
document and ascribing descriptive codes (e.g. ‘Othering’, ‘history-
context’, ‘geopolitics’, ‘migration’ and ‘radicalization/terrorism’) to
highlighted sections of text. Highlighted, coded sections were subjected
to a textual analysis using Fairclough’s (2003) approach derived from
critical linguistics. This analysis involved several lines of examination.
For example, I explored the grammar (sentence structure, tense, pro-
nominal choices, etc.) used in these sections, semantics (word meanings
and their contexts), and each excerpt’s possible pragmatic and sub-
textual relations (underlying assumptions and meanings, incon-
sistencies and contradictions, and implicit statements). Underlying as-
sumptions could relate to diﬀerent value systems, assumptions about
‘truth’ in the text, or about what is ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’ (Fairclough,
2003). In a discussion about possible futures, modality is also an im-
portant grammatical dimension, e.g. use of modal verbs (‘might’,
‘would’ or ‘could’) and modal adjectives (‘possible’ or ‘probable’). My
interpretations of these linguistic features were informed by both the
concepts that inform the paper’s analysis – e.g. racialization, natur-
alization, terrorism and radicalization – and the political contexts that
underpin each document. For the contextual analysis, I adopted Waitt’s
(2010: 255) technique of familiarization. This included conducting
background research on each of the texts, their authorship, technolo-
gical medium, audience and reception. The contextual analysis also
operated across multiple scales. Alongside analysis of the production
and reception of the three texts themselves, these documents were si-
tuated in relation to broader political debates, e.g. on histories of CIM,
‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’ discourses (Bettini,
2014), and on the geopolitics of the War on Terror. Importantly,
however, whilst I argue that these examples illustrate racial logics that
naturalize populations, racialization in this context works at the scale of
underlying assumptions and associations. This paper utilises the concept
of ‘logics’ to explore how racialized constructions of populations (built
on underlying assumptions and associations) are framed in relation to
2 This empirical analysis (of three examples from climate security publica-
tions (Campbell et al., 2007; German Advisory Council on Global Change
(WGBU), 2007, and National Intelligence Council (NIC), 2009) ties in to a
broader critical discourse analysis (CDA) conducted as part of my PhD research
on the role of racial and national identities in climate security discourses
(Telford, 2017). Importantly, however, this paper focuses on a more speciﬁc
analysis of a particular empirical context, racialization of CIM from the MENA
region to the EU in earlier climate security discourses (2007–10), and thus the
conclusions drawn reﬂect this context speciﬁcally.
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possible climate-insecure futures.
4. Racial logics and climate security
This paper’s central contention is that assumptions about what
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations are, of what they represent, or what
have the capacity for, are held in chains of association with assumptions
about what could, might, or will happen in climate-insecure futures (for
example rising sea-levels and coastal erosion, increased frequencies of
extreme weather events, etc.). Racial logics are thus predicated upon
the connections drawn between naturalized populations (‘Muslim’ and
‘African’ climate-induced migrants) and what these naturalized as-
sumptions suggest for outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures.
The theorization of logics I employ draws upon Hall’s (1986) con-
ceptualization of ‘ideology’ and Anderson’s (2010) account of antici-
patory action and future geographies. Whereas Hall (1986) argues for
an anti-essentialist, non-deterministic ‘Marxism without guarantees’,
Anderson’s (2010) conceptualization is based on a Foucauldian analytic
of how uncertain futures are governed. For Hall, before ideological
consensus stabilizes, it is at the scale of premise and assumption that
particular statements are naturalized as ‘true’. Although Anderson’s
(2010) piece draws upon a wider assemblage of ‘elements’, of which
‘statements’ are a particular component of ‘styles’, discursive sig-
niﬁcations are important for his account. Therefore, although
Anderson’s (2010) and Hall’s (1986) theorizations are from radically
diﬀerent schools of critical thought and cannot be simplistically
equated, I argue there are some instructive points of intersection.
Hall (1986: 29, original emphasis) highlights the problem of
ideology. This is how, within a materialist Marxist framework, ideas
arise and are contested within social formations. Hall (1986: 26) deﬁnes
ideologies as ‘the mental frameworks – the languages, concepts, cate-
gories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation – which dif-
ferent classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, de-
ﬁne, ﬁgure out and render intelligible the way society works.’ Makus
(1990) writes that, for Hall, critical studies of ideology should in-
vestigate ways in which ideological meanings are implicated in unequal
systems of power: political, economic and technological structures (e.g.
education systems) that confer ideological consensus in societies. Hall
(1996) argues that meaning is socially constructed: contestations over
meaning contribute to broader sedimentations of an ideological con-
sensus, claims to universal validity for partial worldviews, or what
Makus (1990: 498) describes as ‘that part of the truth which takes it for
the whole truth.’
Ideological constructions tender whole ‘logics’ as the ‘common
sense’ of a culture: they depend on a series of taken-for-granted as-
sumptions about reality, the ‘reality eﬀect’ of ideology (Hall, 1996:
141). As Makus (1990: 499) states: ‘Losing their propositional status,
premises are transformed into narrative statements that are resistant to
alternative interpretations of events.’ As such, these premises – and the
‘logics’ they comprise – are naturalized as narratives and truths (pre-
mises work as a chain of reasoning to produce statements as natural,
essential or inevitable) (Hall, 1996). Crucially, ‘logics’ in this sense are
not a chain of valid, necessary premises, but are only one possible form
of discursive arrangement. Hall’s (1996: 140) deﬁnition of ‘logic’ is ‘an
apparently necessary chain of implication between statement and pre-
mise’. The ‘apparently’ is fundamental: it is not the case that premises
must pass logical rules of validation to aﬃrm the statement, but rather
that they are reiﬁed as naturalized narratives or ‘truths’ that, when
ordered as this chain of reasoning, represent the ideological consensus
as ‘reality’. This conceptualization, of logics as socially constructed and
not necessarily attached to fundamental rules, is an important facet to
the understanding of ‘logics’ deployed in this paper.
I argue Anderson’s (2010) account of logics supplements Hall’s ac-
count in productive ways. Anderson (2010) theorizes the assembling of
various elements – statements, aﬀects, programmes, material objects
and so forth – as modes of ‘anticipatory action’ to govern uncertain
futures and protect valued lives in liberal democracies. He (2010: 779)
distinguishes between ‘styles’ (statements through which the abstract
notion of ‘the future’ is disclosed and related to), ‘practices’ which give
content to speciﬁc futures through acts of performing, imagining and
calculating, and ‘logics’ that legitimize and enable action. ‘Logics’ are ‘a
programmatic way of formalizing, deploying and justifying action in
the here and now. Logics involve action that aims to prevent, mitigate,
adapt to, prepare for or pre-empt certain futures’ (Anderson, 2010: 778-
9). Anderson (2010) locates three anticipatory logics. ‘Precaution’ acts
upon a threat once it has been identiﬁed, in the face of uncertainty but
before it reaches a point of irreversibility. ‘Pre-emption’ can act on a
threat that has not yet appeared and is immersed in its conditions of
emergence. Finally, ‘preparedness’ is about adapting to the aftermath of
a threatening episode and dealing with its eﬀects (Anderson, 2010). For
Anderson (2010), logics need not have a primary actor, target or spatial
form; they coexist across contexts (e.g. climate change or terrorism);
and can exceed any one case. However, they are not totally detached
and ‘are continually being reassembled in attempts to govern diﬀerent
domains of life’ (Anderson, 2010: 778). To summarize, ‘logics’ in
Anderson’s (2010) theorization involve two constitutive elements: in-
terventions to mitigate, avoid or adapt to a future that has – through
styles and practices – been ‘rendered actionable’, and rationalizations
that value some lives over others in liberal democracies.
Working from Hall’s and Anderson’s accounts, logics are deﬁned as
contingent, discursively constructed series of essentializing propositions, as-
sumptions or associations that rationalize and legitimize possible future
outcomes or interventions. Although constructed in context-speciﬁc
power-knowledge relations, ‘logics’ are also cross-contextual. They are
not grounded in an a priori agency, but are diﬀerentially constituted
through unequal power relations and formed from associations and
propositions (about naturalized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced
migrants) in climate security discourses. Following Anderson, I argue
that logics are not only oriented towards historic or present signiﬁca-
tions, but also towards possible futures and the outcomes and inter-
ventions legitimized in these futures. This temporality is a central point
of intersection: logics represent a point at which discursively rendered
series of associations and assumptions (historic and present signiﬁca-
tions of naturalized populations) are framed in relation to multiple,
possible climate-insecure futures.
Moreover, racial logics are discursively constructed. Following
Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 406), discourse refers to ‘a speciﬁc series of
representations and practices through which meanings are produced,
social relations established, and political or ethical outcomes made
more or less possible.’ Discourses’ capacity to direct conditions of
possibility are important for US and EU climate securities: to mediate
between historic/present signiﬁcations of identity and what these
meanings render possible in climate-insecure futures. Thus,
Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 406, following Butler (1990)) argue that
imaginative geographies in US national security strategies are perfor-
mative: they perform the eﬀects they name and constitute the subjects
and objects of which they speak. Through processes of iteration and
citation, constrained by historical and present meanings and realities,
discourses give rise to new possibilities and formations (Bialasiewicz
et al., 2007). In this ‘performative geopolitics’, previous articulations
are reworked to ‘provide the conditions of possibility for current and
future action’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 417). Related to the concept of
‘racial logics’, a ‘performative geopolitics’ suggests that present and
historic signiﬁcations of racialized identities work to delimit conditions
of possibility for climate-insecure futures. Racial logics are performa-
tive in that current and historic signiﬁcations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’
climate-induced migrants condition possibilities for what might happen
in climate-insecure futures.
Racial logics represent a conceptual crossroads between presents
and possible futures, with racialized Othering an important constituent
of these crossroads. As security analysts have considered climate
change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates existing security issues,
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e.g. ‘conﬂict’ (Buxton and Hayes, 2016), this does not mean that human
subjects considered as Others are necessarily the direct, ﬁrst-order
‘threat’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012) around which security institu-
tions mobilize. As racial Others, I utilize Goldberg’s (1992: 553) deﬁ-
nition of ‘race’ as a ‘ﬂuid, transforming, historically speciﬁc concept
parasitic on theoretic and social discourses for the meaning it assumes
at given historical moments.’ Race espouses multiple, context-speciﬁc
meanings (based on biological (e.g. skin colour) and cultural (e.g. re-
ligious aﬃliation) traits) and naturalizes these to particular popula-
tions. Racial logics explore the role that naturalized assumptions about
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations play in demarcating outcomes and
interventions in possible climate-insecure futures.
Importantly, racial logics are not only explicit statements about
what a particular population ‘is’ and how that population ‘might’,
‘would’, ‘could’, ‘is likely to’ or ‘will’ react in climate-insecure futures.
They also contain underlying assumptions that associate groups – pos-
sible ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants – with particular
traits, e.g. a latent capacity for terrorism. As a form of discursive con-
struction, racial logics are formulated in context-speciﬁc moments of US
and EU climate security discourses. Speciﬁcally, in moments of US and
EU climate security documents where scenarios of future climate in-
security are introduced (e.g. extreme weather events or reduced agri-
cultural yields), racialized assumptions underpin how particular po-
pulations (‘Muslim’ and ‘African’) might act in such climate-insecure
futures. These moments – interpreted as racial logics – are the focus of
this paper’s empirical analysis. Grounded in the context of possible CIM
from the MENA region to the EU, I argue that racial logics not only
delimit assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrants’ actions, but
also suggest potentially exclusionary outcomes (e.g. fortressed bor-
dering practices) in climate-insecure futures.
5. Climate-induced migration from the MENA region to the EU
Migration from MENA countries to the EU has been especially
prominent since the 1950s. Numbers increased after Algerian in-
dependence (1962) with a series of bilateral recruitment agreements:
Morocco signed these with West Germany and France in 1963, Belgium
in 1964, and the Netherlands in 1969 (White, 2011). After the OPEC
embargo and oil crisis (1973/4), European states and the EU have in-
creasingly sought to restrict migration and, from the 1990s onwards,
drafted readmission agreements for irregular migrants’ repatriation (El
Qadim, 2014). However, despite increased securitization of the EU’s
external borders – enabled by the 1985 Schengen Agreement and es-
tablishment of FRONTEX (the EU’s border agency) in 2004 – migration
from MENA countries to the EU has continued. An estimated 300,000
Tunisians were living abroad in 2003, alongside 800,000 Algerians (by
2000) (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). As a transit country, Libya has become
increasingly important to the EU. The Libyan and Italian governments
signed an agreement (in 2003) whereby immigration liaison oﬃcers
would be exchanged between the two nation-states and immigration
centres commissioned in Libya (Lutterbeck, 2009).
These histories of migration became intertwined with climate
change discourses from the mid-late 2000s. Theories connecting en-
vironmental drivers and migration stretch back to the 19th century:
writing in 1891, Ravenstein argued that environmental factors (e.g.
climatic changes) were among many causal variations that could in-
ﬂuence migration (Piguet, 2013). Essam Al-Hinnawi brought the term
‘environmental refugee’ to the fore in a 1985 UNEP report to grapple
with the problems of individuals forced to leave their homes due to
natural disasters (Weinthal et al., 2015). ‘Environmental refugees’ were
also cited in the inﬂuential Brundtland Report (1987) (Boas, 2015).
Norman Myers (2005) predicted the existence of 200 million climate-
induced migrants by 2050, but Methmann and Oels (2015) identify that
this ﬁgure assumes every person resident in an area with predicted
climate change impacts, e.g. coastal erosion, would be forced to move
(Myers concedes that his estimate, though based on the best available
data at the time, relied on ﬂawed extrapolations (Brown, 2008)). The
ﬁgure takes no account of the complexities of migration (mediated by
social, economic, political and cultural dynamics), or the range of
adaptive strategies (e.g. livelihood diversiﬁcation) available in aﬀected
areas (Methmann and Oels, 2015).
From the mid-2000s, CIM received increased attention from security
institutions: Boas (2015) contends that the 2007 and 2011 UNSC de-
bates on climate change are key contributors to this securitization. In
2008, the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana and the European
Commission produced a report that notes the possibility of CIM from
Africa to the EU. They (2008: 8) write: ‘In Southern Africa, droughts are
likely to intensify … Migration in this region, but also migration from
other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migra-
tion) is likely to intensify’. This report represents one of the EU’s ﬁrst
statements on climate security and CIM (Trombetta, 2014). It is par-
alleled by a series of US publications (see, for example, Campbell et al.,
2007, discussed below) that speculate on CIM from Africa to the EU. In
her analysis of CIM debates, Oels (2016) proposes three discourses. First
is ‘climate refugees’, a discourse disseminated by security institutions
and NGOs and which casts CIM as a security threat that justiﬁes harsh
measures, e.g. strict border controls. Oels’ (2016) second discourse is
‘human security’: this looks ‘to save’ climate-induced migrants and di-
rects attention towards risk management strategies, international de-
velopment and humanitarian intervention as possible solutions. Finally,
CIM is presented as an adaptation strategy; individuals are encouraged
to utilize migration to build resilience and economic opportunities
(Black et al., 2011; Oels, 2016). Similarly, Bettini (2014) diﬀerentiates
between securitized ‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’
registers in his account of the biopolitics of CIM. The ‘security’ register
locates a potentially dangerous, ‘pathologically unﬁt’ migrant engaged
in ‘bad circulation’, whilst the ‘migration-as-adaptation’ register (linked
to human security) promotes a resilient, adaptable and entrepreneurial
migrant engaged in ‘good circulation’ (Bettini, 2014: 191).
Summarizing the security, threats-based CIM discourse, Oels (2016:
192) states that ‘the discourse spreads fear about climate refugees’ and
is ‘undeniably racist’. She (2016) draws upon Baldwin’s (2013a) ana-
lysis of Michael Nash’s 2010 ﬁlm Climate Refugees and points out that it
touches upon racist stereotypes of Western experts assisting poor vic-
tims of climate impacts in a ‘dangerous’ Global South. Baldwin (2012:
627) identiﬁes a range of modes of alterity in CIM discourse, e.g. ‘in-
digeneity, ‘the Muslim’ or ‘the terrorist’, but centres on a form of
postcolonial alterity oriented to the future. Instead of a dialectical dif-
ferent-from relation critiqued by postcolonial theorists, Baldwin (2012)
argues that the Other in CIM discourses is conceived of as yet-to-come.
Baldwin (2013a) expands his analysis to argue ‘the climate migrant’ is
racialized through three tropes. ‘Naturalization’ is the way in which
climate migrants are represented with nature idioms (e.g. the assertion
that they move due to natural forces and not internal reason). ‘Loss of
status’ refers to depictions of climate migrants as an excess of the ter-
ritorialized, international political order. Finally, ‘ambiguity’ refers to
portrayals of climate migrants as indeterminate: a product of multi-
factorial, indeﬁnable and incalculable relations (Baldwin, 2013a).
Building on these concerns about racialization and xenophobia in a
securitized CIM debates, I explore how a racialized ‘Muslim’ and
‘African’ Other is constructed in US and EU climate security debates.
6. Radicalized climate-induced migrants?
Through an analysis of racial logics in three EU and US climate
security publications (representations of CIM from the MENA region to
the EU), I argue that a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is constructed
with a potential capacity for radicalization and terrorism. Hall (1996)
contends that logics – grounded in premises and assumptions – natur-
alize ideological statements as the ‘truth’ about ideologies and cultures.
Similarly, racial logics naturalize particular characteristics to ‘Muslim’
and ‘African’ populations. ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced
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migrants are not inherently prone to radicalization or terrorism, but are
socially constructed as such; they are not ‘grounded in nature, but
producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall, 1996: 141).
As racialized Others, they are constituted from naturalized assumptions.
As Anderson (2010) attests, logics are a programmatic means, part of a
broader anticipatory politics, which mobilise futures in liberal democ-
racies. Racial logics, on the basis of naturalized assumptions, delimit
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants’ future possibilities in
conditions of climate insecurity. I argue that naturalized assumptions
about ‘Muslim and ‘African’ migrant populations are mobilised to
speculate on potentially unjust future outcomes, speciﬁcally possibi-
lities for securitized bordering practices and a ‘sedentary bias’ against
migration to the EU (Bakewell, 2008).
I start with the report The Age of Consequences: The Foreign and
National Security Implications of Climate Change (Campbell et al., 2007).
Published by the Center for Strategic Studies and Center for a New
American Security (two US think tanks), this publication is one of
several moments in what Liberatore (2013) terms the ‘2007 turn’ of
climate security discourses. Alongside the ﬁrst UNSC debate on the
security implications of climate change, a series of international pub-
lications emerged which discuss climate change and security (e.g. from
the Center for Naval Analyses (2007) and the European Commission
with Javier Solana (2008)). In a study of media coverage in 9 countries
(the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa,
Thailand, and Singapore), Schäfer et al. (2016) note that overall the
number of articles on climate change which use securitizing language
(as a proportion of the total) jumps from 0.09% between 1996 and 2006
to 0.57% between 2007 and 2010. Writing about the possibility of
climate-induced migration from South Asia and Africa to the EU,
Campbell et al. (2007: 59) note (Fig. 1):
In this excerpt, Campbell et al. (2007) speculate on an increase to
Europe’s Muslim population in response to climate insecurities. The
language used to describe the consequences of migration is consistently
negative: ‘suspicion’, ‘exacerbate existing tensions’, ‘internal political
tension’, ‘attack’ and ‘homegrown terrorist’. Campbell et al. (2007) also
make several assumptions about cross-border migration, including a
‘degree of instability’ generated by an increase to Europe’s population.
Associations between Muslim climate-induced migrants and a possible
capacity for terrorism are repeated several times in the report.
Campbell et al. (2007) assert that ‘a surge in the number of Muslim
immigrants … could increase the likelihood of radicalization’, and that
the ‘suspicion with which Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities
are viewed by many would be greatly intensiﬁed by an attack from a
“homegrown terrorist”’. Elsewhere in the document, Campbell et al.
(2007: 86) state: ‘Many of Europe’s Muslim minorities, including Rus-
sia’s, are not well-assimilated today, and the stress of major climate
change and sea-level rise may well foster social disruption and radi-
calization.’ Campbell et al. (2007: 106) also stress that ‘an inﬂux of
Muslims into Europe … could lead to new tensions over foreign policy
priorities (e.g. Muslim countries and Islamist terrorism).’ In all of these
quotations, Muslim populations are linked to possibilities of radicali-
zation and terrorism. It could be that repeated associations of Muslim
populations with a capacity for or vulnerability towards terrorism and
radicalization naturalize these traits to Muslim populations and by ex-
tension produce a racial ‘Muslim’ Other. Modal verbs, e.g. ‘could lead
to’, ‘would be’, or ‘may well foster’, orient ‘Muslim’ populations towards
climate-insecure futures. As such, a racial logic is constituted which
represents this temporal intersection of historic and current signiﬁca-
tions of racialized Others (‘Muslim’ populations and potential capacities
for radicalization and terrorism), and how these signiﬁcations inﬂect
outcomes in diﬀerent possible futures (terrorist attacks and political
instability). A naturalized capacity for terrorism becomes an additional
factor in climate-insecure futures: because Muslims are associated with
latent possibilities for terrorism and radicalization, this could or may
well foster such responses from a ‘Muslim’ Other in future conditions of
climate insecurity. As such, a racial logic functions to delimit a racial
‘Muslim’ Other’s future possibilities in US and EU climate security
discourse.
As Edward Said (1997 (1981)) documents, there are broader his-
torical associations of Muslims and Islam with violence in US politics.
Said (1997 (1981)) focuses primarily on 20th century political events,
for example the 1973/4 oil crisis, 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the
Iranian hostage crisis (1979–81) in which the American embassy in
Tehran was unlawfully occupied on 4th November 1979. He (1997
(1981)) argues that the media scrutiny surrounding these events fuelled
negative perceptions of Muslims and Islam as linked to fundamentalism
and violence. Gregory (2004) also critiques the imaginative geo-
graphies through which Islam has been constructed as the inferior,
violent Other to an advanced US in the War on Terror. However, such
histories are only tendentiously intertwined with US climate security
discourses. The connection is not direct, but instead a racial logic. It is
therefore about how historic signiﬁcations of what ‘Muslim’ popula-
tions represent (naturalized capacities for terrorism or radicalization)
feed into limited, context-speciﬁc moments of EU and US climate se-
curity discourses and are reconﬁgured for a new discursive context. For
a securitized CIM discourse articulated in the future-conditional tense,
the racial logic orients a racialized ‘Muslim’ Other towards possible
outcomes of radicalized violence in climate-insecure futures. Of this
context, in a visual analysis of 140 US and EU climate security docu-
ments, Methmann and Rothe (2014) found that all images were people
of colour, predominantly female, and depicted in passive roles that
diminish their agency (as ‘victims’ and ‘climate refugees’). Methmann
and Rothe (2014) contend that the European border regime (e.g.
FRONTEX) is notably absent from these images. To develop these ideas
further, I draw upon examples from the 2009 National Intelligence
Estimate on climate change. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), an
interagency group that supports the Director of National Intelligence
((DNI), the President’s highest advisor on national security issues),
produced this report. The NIC publish long-term analyses for the US
intelligence community (e.g. Department of State and CIA) (DNI, 2015).
For the Estimate, the NIC produced a series of regional reports and
consultations about the geopolitical implications of climate change (to
2030). In a regional report and consultation on the geopolitical im-
plications of climate change in North Africa, the authors (who do not
represent the views of the US Government as the report is developed
from consultations), note Fig. 2:
These quotes (NIC, 2009) draw upon associations of ‘Muslim’ and
‘African’ populations with possibilities of terrorism. This is not only the
assertion that the ‘demographic ascension of Europe’s Muslim popula-
tion’ is an ‘increasing concern’ because of the ‘threat from Islamic ex-
tremism’, but also assumptions about the ‘climate change card’ North
African states might play to ‘garner Western aid’ as they have done with
the ‘terrorism card’. It could be that repeated associations of Muslim
and North African states and populations with the risk of terrorism
naturalize this trait to these populations. Modal verbs (e.g. ‘could be-
come’ or ‘might resort’) also suggest a racial logic that naturalizes the
capacities a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is assumed to embody
and frames this against what these capacities suggest for outcomes in
possible climate-insecure futures. The racial logic draws upon associa-
tions of actors and populations with particular traits (of ‘Muslim’ and
‘African’ climate-induced migrants and North African states with the
threat of ‘Islamic extremism’, ‘the terrorism card’, and the alteration to
Europe’s ‘cultural, ethnic and religious composition’) and directs these
towards outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures. These include
North African states’ warnings of a ‘climate-induced regional crisis’ to
‘garner Western aid’, and of a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to prevent migration
from Sub-Saharan African countries to the EU. As such, the racial logic
is comprised of associations and assumptions about naturalized
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations and how these are held in relation to
outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures, in particular exclu-
sionary containment policies articulated as a ‘cordon sanitaire’.
Negative lexis also describes CIM and responses to it, e.g. ‘increasing
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concerns’, ‘unimpeded ﬂows’, ‘high-priority security concerns’, and
‘cordon sanitaire’. Cordon sanitaire is originally a French phrase denoting
a barrier erected to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and pla-
gues, with the earliest references in 1826 and 1847 (Oxford English
Dictionary, 2016a). It also refers to a ring of buﬀer states constructed to
prevent the invasion of a protected political authority. Conceived of as a
mechanism of disease control and prevention, or a geopolitical
boundary to defend against external threats, a cordon sanitaire is a ne-
gative vision of possible responses to CIM, one that could exclude po-
tential climate-induced migrants. As Cisneros (2008: 591) notes, re-
presentations of immigrants as pollutants dehumanize migrants by
denying their agency and reducing their status to that of a ‘dangerous
substance’. In a seminal 2007 report by the WGBU (the German Ad-
visory Council on Global Change, an independent scientiﬁc advisory
group established by the German Federal Government (1992) in the
run-up to the Rio Summit), the authors write of possibilities for re-
pressive containment policies in response to CIM (Fig. 3):
In these excerpts, the WGBU express concern about disruptive ef-
fects of CIM in scenarios of climate-insecure futures. This is exempliﬁed
with ‘“Völkerwanderwung”’, a German term used to describe migra-
tions en masse, e.g. in Europe during the Roman Empire or Middle Ages
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2016b). Consequences of migration are also
Fig. 1. Quotations from Campbell et al. (2007: 59).
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associated with possibilities of radicalization and extremism. This in-
cludes the claim that ‘immigration from North Africa’ could ‘allow the
inﬁltration of more and more members of extremist groups into
Europe’, but also that immigrants could turn to ‘radical religious
groups’, a choice informed by the ‘huge popularity’ of these groups in
migrants’ home countries. These images are also gendered, with the
WGBU’s observation that migrants could be ‘predominantly young men’
and that ‘many young people see Europe as their only opportunity’.
Possibilities for violence are also articulated with reference to the
‘youth riots in France in 2005’ (an example also used in the Age of
Consequences report (Campbell et al., 2007: 59)). These representations
construct an image of young, male North ‘African’ migrants who, in
scenarios of climate stresses and xenophobic backlashes, are especially
vulnerable to the inﬂuence of ‘radical religious’ groups and have a ca-
pacity to embrace extremism in the face of these vulnerabilities. Such
images reinforce a racialized image of young ‘African’males as prone to
radicalization and terrorism (accentuated in the aftermath of 9/11)
(Puar and Rai, 2002). Whereas in The Age of Consequences and NIC
report modal verbs are used to indicate future possibilities (‘could’,
‘might’, etc.), in the WGBU excerpt the particular scenario being de-
scribed accords these assumptions a higher likelihood, e.g. ‘migration
issues will therefore become increasingly sensitive’, or ‘there is in-
creased ghettoization of North African immigrants’. The racial logic
does not suggest how naturalized assumptions delimit future possibi-
lities, but narrows this to probabilities of high likelihood or near cer-
tainty. As such, whereas racial logics in previous examples conﬁgure
assumptions and associations (which naturalize ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’
climate-induced migrants) towards multiple – if delimited – outcomes
in climate-insecure futures, the racial logic in this case is more de-
terministic to reﬂect the severity of the climate change scenario.
Interestingly, the WGBU (2007) do not name migrant populations as
‘Muslim’ in the above excerpts. This could be because they recognize
that repeated associations of Muslims with extremism or terrorism
could naturalize these traits to such populations and wish to avoid this
possibility. It could also be that (although this stills risks a naturaliza-
tion of ‘African’ or ‘North African’ populations with extremism) the
authors are making a factual point that not all African migrants would
be Muslims. This observation highlights a ‘politics of naming’ (or ‘non-
naming’) in the WGBU excerpts. Focusing on the labels ‘terrorist’,
‘bandit’ and ‘rebel’, Bhatia (2005: 6-7) posits that ‘the politics of naming
is about… examining how names are made, assigned and disputed, and
how this contest is as aﬀected by a series of global dynamics and
events.’ Naming is an exercise of power and continent assignations
about what can be known about a subject, place or group (Nadarajah
and Sriskandarajah, 2005). The practice of naming carries implications
for which populations are associated with particular capacities in pos-
sible futures, e.g. ‘Muslim’, ‘African’, and ‘migrant’ and possibilities of
‘radicalization’, ‘terrorist activity’ and ‘extremism’. As such, although it
could be that the WGBU excerpt is associated with deterministic racial
logics that associate particular populations with a potential capacity for
radicalization, these underlying assumptions are not necessarily pre-
dicated on the explicit naming of these populations.
Fig. 2. Quotations from NIC Report (2009).
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7. Strategies of containment?
Racial logics are not only concerned with naturalized identities, but
also how these direct possible outcomes and interventions in climate-
insecure futures. The logic – constructed from naturalized associations
and assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations – thus directs
and delimits what such outcomes may be in conditions of future climate
insecurity. In this sense, the racial logic is performative: it performs the
eﬀects it names. These eﬀects are that the associations and assumptions
the logic is based upon (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations as en-
dowed with a potential capacity for terrorism and radicalization) can
work to direct outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures. In both
the NIC (2009) and WGBU (2007) reports, strategies of containment are
suggested as possible outcomes in scenarios of climate insecurity. In the
NIC report, this is expressed as a cordon sanitaire (2009: 31), and as
‘Fortress Europe’ in the WGBU’s (2007: 126) words. Duﬃeld and Evans
(2011) situate containment policies as part of a global biopolitical life-
chances divide. Whereas the mobility of those in developed countries is
facilitated, problems in the Global South are to be solved locally: ‘what
could be called ‘underdeveloped life’ has been routinely geographically
contained’ (Duﬃeld and Evans, 2011: 94, original emphasis). Bakewell
(2008) labels this phenomenon the ‘sedentary bias’ of development
policy and locates it within European histories of interaction with
African populations. Early European colonizers controlled migration
patterns to provide labour for mineral extraction, colonial administra-
tion, and most horriﬁcally the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Bakewell,
2008). Attempts to control migration continued into 20th century de-
velopment policy, e.g. the promotion of remittances as a development
strategy (Bakewell, 2008). White (2014: 835) notes that a ‘fortress
mentality’ can exacerbate environmental insecurities and policies of
containment could produce exclusionary outcomes in conditions of
climate insecurity. This is despite an academic consensus suggesting
Fig. 3. Quotations from WGBU report (2007).
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that climate impacts are more likely to be linked to localized, internal
displacement, not international or intercontinental migration (White,
2011).
In a 2013 European Commission paper to accompany the EU’s
strategy on adaptation to climate change, the authors recognize the
diﬃculties of pinpointing environmental factors in migratory decisions.
The Commission (2013: 13) submits that ‘the impact of climate change
on migration ﬂows to the EU is unlikely to be substantial’. Similarly, a
2011 FRONTEX report of future migration scenarios notes that climate
change is expected to cause displacements globally and some “en-
vironmental refugees” may arrive to the EU, but this is not articulated
in terms of disruptive, mass migrations. However, in relation to climate
adaptation strategies, as Scheﬀran et al. (2012: 122) contend: ‘Eur-
opean states have the tendency to use development strategies to achieve
immigration control following the adaptation-to-prevent-migration
path’. They (2012) cite a 2002 bilateral programme between the Malian
and French governments in which co-development projects (e.g. edu-
cation and electriﬁcation schemes) were funded in the Kayes region of
the Senegal River valley. In 2009, the French government withdrew its
support for the programme when the Malian government refused to
sign an agreement enforcing repatriation of irregular migrants
(Scheﬀran et al., 2012). Furthermore, White (2011: 74) documents how
transit states ‘began to amp the idea of climate refugees as a threat in
the late ‘00 s’. For example, in September 2009, Morocco hosted the
meeting of the International Union for the Scientiﬁc Study of Popula-
tion; at this event, King Mohammed VI gave a speech that directly re-
ferences CIM and its links to food security, desertiﬁcation and sea-level
rise (White, 2011). Although these examples are disparate, they in-
dicate the involvement of national governments (transit states and EU
Member States) in CIM narratives and the possibilities this could sug-
gest for exclusionary containment policies in climate-insecure futures.
Fundamentally, they aﬃrm the notion that racial logics are not only
speculative discursive constructions about how naturalized populations
will respond to conditions of future climate insecurity. They are also
intricately intertwined in the political interventions suggested by such
logics: possibilities for exclusionary bordering practices and a ‘seden-
tary bias’ against CIM (Bakewell, 2008).
8. Conclusion
This paper has explored the role of racial logics in constructions of a
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other in speciﬁc examples from US and EU cli-
mate security discourses (three publications with a national security
emphasis published from 2007 to 2010, part of the ‘2007 turn’ in cli-
mate security discourse (Liberatore, 2013)). ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’
populations are represented with a latent capacity for radicalization
and terrorism in possible climate-insecure futures. Delimited future
possibilities can carry exclusionary implications, for example fortressed
border policies and discrimination against climate-induced migrants.
Given that naturalized identity constructions remain understudied in
critical CIM and climate security scholarship – and the future-condi-
tional character of CIM debates (Baldwin, 2012) – ‘racial logics’ provide
a useful analytic to examine present-future relationships and their
possibilities. Discussing the category of ‘the Other’, Sara Ahmed (2002:
560-1) writes: ‘To negate or give up on the particularity of others would
involve its own violence: the transformation of others into the ﬁgure of
the other involves its own betrayal of the future, as the possibility that
others might be other than ‘the other’ or as the possibility of being faced
by other others.’ Although Ahmed (2002) argues it is impossible to ever
fully know the other – each other with its own histories of determina-
tion, sociality and power relations – she cautions against its ﬁguration
as the Other, a ﬁguration which negates these diﬀerences. An important
dimension to racial logics is that they, through constructions of a nat-
uralized Other, limit Muslim and African populations’ histories of de-
termination. Importantly, racial logics are also about how these clo-
sures aﬀect outcomes in climate-insecure futures. Ahmed (2002: 5601-
1, my emphasis) writes that the Other involves a ‘betrayal of the future’,
closing down possibilities of knowing others or being faced by ‘other
others’. Thus, racial logics not only neglect histories of determination,
but also delimit possibilities for multiple future socialities to emerge in
climate-changed futures.
It follows that, in critiquing naturalized racial identities, this aﬀords
opportunities to challenge the delimited future possibilities such iden-
tities suggest. This raises the requirement to think about more just fu-
ture possibilities. This is especially resonant in a context where ‘the
large numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean and the push to securitize
borders within and around Europe are a warning against the con-
servative responses that could emerge against those ‘disenfranchised’
by the impacts of environmental and climate change’ (Bettini et al.,
2016: 8). Bettini et al. (2016) argue that in a ﬁeld punctuated with
multiple discourses, the exclusionary implications of securitized CIM
require an aﬃrmative politics of climate justice. This paper echoes this
call. If exclusionary, containment-based approaches to CIM are to be
challenged, this requires both critical analysis of the naturalized as-
sumptions that racial logics are constituted from, but also further ex-
amination of what pluralistic, just climate-secure futures would look
like in practice.
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